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Resumen: El presente artículo analiza la genealo-
gía de la universidad desde el punto de las tres notas
que la definen: libertad, autonomía y universidad. A
partir de este análisis muestra que la tendencia de
universalidad procede de la teología, mientras que
la tradición de autonomía posee un origen relativa-
mente secular. De esta manera se pone de relieve
que la teología no es solamente un tema que ha de
tenerse en cuenta en las controversias universi-
tarias, sino que afecta a la naturaleza misma de
la universidad: al abordar la crisis de la teología en la
universidad, podemos estar abordando la cuestión
de la crisis actual de la universidad como tal.
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Abstract: This article analyses the genealogy of the
university from the perspective of its three defining
characteristics: freedom, self-government and
universality. The Author suggest that the univer-
salising tendency of university is theologically
derived, while the tradition of autonomy is of
relatively secular origin. Hence, in addressing the
question of the current crisis of theology within
the university, we may be addressing the question
of the current crisis of the university as such.
Keywords: Theology, University, Faith and Reason,
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I
W hat is a university? A University is usually taken to be an institutionof higher education which pursues free inquiry. But to what degreehas the very nature of inquiry within a university been predetermi-
ned by its constitution and organisation? Is entirely open investigation of
truth possible, or must a university have taken certain overarching decisions
about truth already, in order to be able to organise itself?
A university is also viewed as an independent corporation. But, by which
law must it have been licensed and on what grounds? And who governs a uni-
versity: the teachers, the students, the managers, the trustees, the state go-
vernment? Is not every university also an instrument of political power that
requires the deployment of certain bodies of knowledge that serve the inte-
rests of governmental «administration»? And how can that be compatible
with untrammelled investigation and research?
Yet again, a university is taken to mean an academy of learning that pur-
sues all disciplines and seeks to relate them to each other in a dialectical and
even, aspirationally, an encyclopaedic manner. But what counts as a discipline
and how many subjects should be studied by any one individual and in what
order? To decide on these questions would seem to be to have already decided
much about the nature of possible knowledge and so about accessible truth.
A university then, has been typically considered to be first free, secondly
self-governing, and thirdly universal. How, in that context, should we under-
stand the place of theology within the university? Is such study compatible
with its freedom, autonomy and universality? Many people would today ar-
gue that it is not: that theological dogmatism inhibits free enquiry; that being
beholden to the Church is an affront to university self-government, much as
the power of the Pope was once an affront to English kings; and that theo-
logy as particular to Christianity inhibits the universal and objective study of
religion.
Others, however, in the wake of John Henry Newman in his The Idea of
a University, would argue just the opposite: that the discourse of faith holds
open intellectual possibilities; that the university as free association or guild is
a product of Christendom and that a university cannot be universal if it ex-
cludes the knowledge of God from its purview 1.
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On either side of the debate, however, there is generally a shared as-
sumption that these three defining characteristics of a university belong na-
turally together. However, while that is not entirely untrue, it may also not
be altogether the case. Specifically, there can be a certain tension between the
corporate independence of a university on the one hand and the scope of its
enquiries on the other. This same tension may also involve a split between
independent freedom within a narrow range and a greater freedom of scope
under more constrained overall jurisdiction. I shall explain what I mean
shortly.
As has already been said, the co-belonging of freedom, autonomy, and
universality may usually be taken to be a secular triad, but for a minority re-
port, like that of Newman, it is regarded as a Christian or even a Catholic
Christian one. However, the tension between autonomy and scope, and the
suggested divide of liberty, may also point us towards a more confused lineage:
in some ways secularising, in other ways theological. What I want to suggest
in this lecture is that the universalising tendency is theologically derived, while
the tradition of autonomy is of relatively secular origin, with the question of
free enquiry split between the two.
The implication of this argument is that a university has always been a
site of contestation because of its mixed origins, and that any assessment of the
place of theology within the university has to take account of this circumstan-
ce. A further implication is that this particular topic is not just one question
that might be asked about the nature of a university. On the contrary, I shall
argue that the question of theology and the university is, as Newman thought,
commensurate with the entire scope of «the idea of a university». Hence in
addressing the question of the current crisis of theology within the university,
we may be addressing the question of the current crisis of the university as
such.
II
The simplest way of making good these claims is to offer a brief geneal-
ogy of the university as a uniquely western institution. Here what stands out
most clearly is that the university was not, from the outset, defined in terms
of the three characteristics which are today broadly assumed. To the con-
trary, it was initially defined sheerly in terms of its autonomy: the relevant
meaning of universitas as the universitas magistrorum et scholarum was the
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coming together of all teachers and students in an independent guild-
formation 2.
The precondition of the latter was in fact particularity and sense of dif-
ference, not comprehensiveness and openness. Thus the very first university,
that of Bologna, founded in late 1088, was shaped by law students represent-
ing the interests of emerging nations, cities, and localities as against those of
either the Church or the Empire 3. It is valid to describe this as a secularising
move, albeit with a triple proviso. From the outset Canon law was studied
alongside civil and in the latter case the corpus of Roman law which they stu-
died had already been given a specifically Christian imprint by Justinian. More-
over, the very habit of making free associations was something ultimately
nurtured within that initial and novel international free association which was
the Church itself. These qualifications should remind us that a «secularising»
move is not necessarily an anti-theological one, since theology itself may in-
sist upon the unhampered exercise of natural liberty in certain domains.
Independence then was born of a particular interest being fought for.
Certainly Bologna counted as a studium generale because it combined the study
of the arts – that is to say of the trivium of grammar, rhetoric and logic plus
the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy – with the
study of one of the sciences of the three «higher faculties» – law. However, the
purpose of all this was by no means to achieve a universal theoretical scope,
but rather to ensure the production of a body of literate, numerate and legally
competent civil lawyers. The two other «higher» sciences, namely, medicine
and theology, were specifically not studied at this institution. And inquiry into
jurisprudence was «free» simply in the sense of relatively free from the pres-
sures exerted by canon lawyers or lawyers working in the interests of the em-
pire, which eventually set up a university of its own in Naples in 1224.
This pattern proved for a considerable time to be a normative one, espe-
cially in the south of Europe. Universities tended to specialise in law or me-
dicine and but rarely in theology – indeed only in the case of the northern uni-
versities of Paris, Oxford and Cambridge. If it is certainly the case that the
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independent study of law and medicine helped to shape a relatively secular
culture, then this was often only by virtue of a narrowing. As with Marsiglio
of Padua and Machiavelli, a conception of civic rule in more this-worldly,
legal, power-orientated, and contractual terms rather than theological and
teleological ones. Or as with the influence on medicine of Avicenna whose
philosophy had in certain ways pre-adumbrated a Cartesian dualism, an in-
creasing focus on the anatomy of the dead and not living body 4.
Significantly, Marsiglio had been trained in medicine rather than law,
and, in anticipation of Hobbes, his naturalism concerning the political body is
linked to his Avicennian naturalism concerning the human physical body 5. If,
eventually, contractualism infected anthropology as such, and an exclusively
anatomical perspective natural philosophy as such, then one could say that
these are two instances of an apparent broadening that is really the sucking
back of a wide scope into a confinement of vision, specific to one area and to
a desire to secrete the interests of that area from other concerns – the politi-
cal from the ethical and theological, the medical from the living, the psychic
and social.
By comparison with the Italian institutions, the northern universities
were less autonomous. The guild in Paris was of masters, not students, and
they were under the patronage of the Church. At Oxford and Cambridge an
equivalent patronage was offered by the English crown. Moreover, the public
prestige and guarantee of the worth of a degree was not achieved through
autonomy, but rather, initially, by papal conferral of a licence to teach any-
where based upon the award of a degree, the ius ubique docendi, first to the uni-
versity of Toulouse, and later to that of Paris. This new mobility of learning
was also backed up by Papal grants of a right to hold benefices elsewhere
while continuing to teach at a studium generale. If Oxford resisted this sort of
transferability and alternation of residence, then it was only able to do so in
terms of the counter-prestige granted by its monarchic protectors.
Oxford and Paris then, were less independent than the Italian institutions
and yet their scope of learning was far greater, and it was these institutions that
became the most paradigmatic for higher education in the future. Why should
that have been the case? Well both the Church and the English Crown
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– perhaps because of its peculiarly theocratic leanings 6 – promoted the study of
theology. This was certainly for pragmatic reasons, but the practical concerns
of the clerical profession extended far more widely than those of law and me-
dicine – to history, to cosmology, and psychology, as well as to words, numbers,
and laws. The tripartition of the higher faculties coincides with one between
the city, the body, and the soul. However, the theological science of the soul is
also the science of the cosmos and of the heavenly city. Theology is in the end
about the entire «divine governance» and so is more than a specialism since it
has implications for all other matters, including those of the body and the
earthly city 7.
What is more, the lineage of the most important university, that of Paris,
from previous «universities» is after all not so clear. It was unusual in having
developed from three cathedral schools: the Palatine, that of Notre Dame,
and that of St. Genevieve 8. Yet it might be more accurate to say that Paris was
different and became exemplary because it was an expanded cathedral school.
In other words, the modern notion of the university as both universal and dis-
cursive or argumentative may (contrary to etymological indication) derive ra-
ther more from the idea of the cathedral school than from that of the Uni-
versity. It can be added here that while such a lineage does not apparently exist
in the case of Oxford, it may apply in the case of Cambridge, since Peterhouse,
the first college, seems to have been a cathedral school of Ely (even though
«the University» was a separate foundation) 9.
But how can one really argue this? Cathedral schools were also founded,
after the Gregorian reforms, for practical, professional reasons. Clergy were
to be more schooled in the arts, though also in theology. The ambience of the
cathedral school was different to that of the University in that it was a succes-
sor to the ancient philosophical academy where learning was linked to the for-
mation of the soul through spiritual exercises and through participation in the
liturgy. The practices of lectio and manuductio in relation to the Bible also
meant that humanistic learning was not all on the side of the pagan legacy 10.
JOHN MILBANK
258 SCRIPTA THEOLOGICA / VOL. 50 / 2018
6 See KANTOROWICZ, E., The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology, Princeton
NJ: Princeton UP, 2016.
7 See THOMAS AQUINAS, ST, I, qq. 103-119, «Treatise on the Divine Government».
8 FERRUOLO, S., The Origins of the University: Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100-1215, Stan-
ford CA: Stanford UP, 1985.
9 LEEDHAM-GREEN, E., A Concise History of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge: CUP, 1996.
10 See JAEGER, C. S., The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe 950-
1260, Philadelphia PN: Pennsylvania UP, 1994.
03. Milbank Estudio  14/06/2018  11:38  Página 258
In this way the Biblically humanistic legacy of Augustine and Bede,
which antedated the more specific promotion of the trivium and the quadri-
vium – and extended variously to matters of music, chronology, geography
and ancient literature – were perpetuated. Yet because and not in spite of this
more religious context, the scope of learning in the cathedral schools became
encyclopaedic. Moreover, the debatability of knowledge also arose in this con-
text, through the application of the arts of the trivium to apparent contradic-
tions – sic et non – in the scriptures and in the writings of the Fathers 11.
Hence the specifically scholastic aspects of medieval university learning
derived in the first place, as the word would suggest, from the schools. To some
degree the later «Renaissance» Humanist reaction against mere logicism was
an attempt to reinfuse the arts with earlier literary, historical and Christian
concerns, in order to ensure that lay education was not just barrenly techni-
cal 12. One could almost say that they were trying to make good the gradual
loss of the original cathedral close context.
It can be added here as an aside that while there is little to no evidence
of any influence of the Islamic madrasa on the Christian university, for the ma-
drasa was not an independent corporation, being controlled by its donors, and
largely pursuing sacred not secular studies, that nevertheless one might say
that the cathedral school was somewhat more like the madrasa than was the
university 13. It therefore becomes of inter-religious significance that I am ar-
guing that the modern university derives as much from the cathedral school
as from the medieval university, so called.
The «school» aspect of the University was also much reinforced by the
arrival of the orders of friars (much inflected by Muslim learning) who ran
their own studia within its corporate bounds: this tended to reconnect dia-
lectical questio with Biblical lectio and with prayer, liturgy and contemplation 14.
In addition, it can be pointed out that the university did not at first displace
the school: in Germany especially this was not the case, and it was cathedral
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schools at Cologne and elsewhere, allied to Dominican studia, that helped
shape the innovative intellects of Albertus Magnus, Dietrich of Freiburg, and
Meister Eckhart.
Yet most decisive of all with respect to the question of «universal» learn-
ing was the pursuit of philosophy. If, by this, one means metaphysics and na-
tural philosophy, then this was not at first covered by either the lower or the
higher faculties. To begin with it was only pursued within the shelter of theo-
logy in terms of an ultimately personal-practical interest in one’s final natural
ends as a human being. Indeed one could claim that philosophy was at first
more independently studied within the madrasa, in those cases where an ini-
tially exclusively religious curriculum was expanded – because theology and
philosophy remained less integrated within Islamic culture.
Nevertheless, as recent researches in France by Alain de Libera and his
pupils like Claude Lafleur have shown, something more like the Islamic situa-
tion started to intrude in the Latin west from the early thirteenth century
onwards 15. With the new acquaintanceship with Aristotelian texts, the study of
metaphysics, physics, and ethics was cautiously added to the trivium’s study
of grammar, logic, and rhetoric and the quadrivium’s study of arithmetic, geo-
metry, astronomy, and music and thereby a certain momentous conflation of the
physical with the mathematical started to arise. Well before the growth of
so-called Latin Averroism, there was also a Latin Avicennianism for which a
neoplatonised Aristotle suggested to some Arts professors the possibility of a
specifically philosophical beatitude. A certain initial reluctance to follow the Arabs
in ranging poetics under logic seems to have been linked to a fear that this might
imply, as commonly for the Arabic philosophers, that the imagistic language of
religion was merely a kind of philosophy for the masses. Eventually this fear had
something to do with the emergence of the condemnations of 1270-1277,
which regarded with suspicion not only any tendencies towards an autonomy of
philosophy, but even the Albertine traditions which ranged philosophical beati-
tude lower than the theological, or identified the two, as with Meister Eckhart 16.
It is important though to see that the perceived threat of a more autono-
mous philosophy was not the threat of a more secular approach to learning. It
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was not even, at least at first true, as Pierre Hadot has claimed, that theology
appropriated the claim of ancient philosophy to be also a spiritual discipline,
a matter of self-cultivation, thereby leaving a residue of a more arid, detached
rationalistic philosophy 17. For to begin with in the thirteenth century, the
challenge was rather from an alternative rational but also spiritual path, even
– well before the Renaissance – from a recrudescence of paganism.
The irony is that it was exactly the attempt to head off this challenge which
much more generated the «secular», disinterested philosophy that we know today.
The Franciscan theologian Duns Scotus, developing Avicenna and in
continuity as well as disagreement with Henry of Ghent, started to render
metaphysics as more unambiguously about Being rather than aporetically about
both God and Being. In consequence he situated God within the field of a uni-
vocal being in such a way as eventually, for his successors, to make the rational
study of God a philosophical specialism, a «natural theology» or «special meta-
physics» within the field of general metaphysics or ontology 18. For Aquinas, by
contrast, the theologian had studied the whole of physics and metaphysics and
understood the latter as obscurely gesturing towards God as the principle of
its subject matter of ens commune, but nonetheless as finally lying outside it in
the domain of revealed sacra doctrina. This had the capacity to revise all meta-
physical conclusions – as, for example, when Aquinas clearly adumbrates a Tri-
nitarian ontology in Summa Contra Gentiles 4.11 and in the Compendium Theo-
logiae 19.
Already with Scotus, metaphysics was becoming proto-epistemological,
since the structures of reality were now defined «transcendentally» in terms
of the conceivable, and of the strict application of the principle of non-
contradiction. The same approach, taken further by the Terminists like
Ockham, tended then to exclude the reality of universals, of real relationality,
and of participative analogy. This was not, contra Marilyn McCord Adams et
al the displacement of metaphysics by logic, but it was the production of a
more narrowly logically-determined metaphysics, no longer engaged with
Platonic eros or Aristotelian existential wonder.
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In this sense it was supposed to be a colder discipline more strictly sub-
ordinate to a theology to whom all engaged warmth was now confined. Yet iro-
nically, just such a metaphysics removed the conceptually realist language for
construing the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, eucharist and the synergic
operation of grace. In consequence the warmth was leached from theology also,
in favour of the predominance of the will and of submission to the will – sheer
will, or indeed sheer force, being the residue that a reduction of judgement to
objective logic tends to leave behind, all the way from Ockham to Hobbes 20.
More generally, if theoretical issues became more questionable in the
Middle Ages, then this was not the result of any sort of new commitment to
a detached «free inquiry», but rather as a result of the tension between the
more static and cosmic vision of the ancient Greeks on the one hand and
the more temporal and narrative vision of the Hebrews on the other. In dif-
ferent ways both Avicenna within Islam and Aquinas within Christianity dis-
tinguished the existential from the essential under the impulse of this clash
and sought to integrate the two 21.
Later, in the Latin West, as I have already implied, this creative distinc-
tion became too much like a sterile divorce. An arguably excessive and actually
unbiblical extraction of revealed contingencies from any cosmological con-
text, and of literal from symbolic word, led in the later thirteenth and four-
teeenth centuries to the formation of a metaphysic but questionably more
congruent with the Biblical vision. It is arguable that this development also
had a practical and institutional aspect. For it was encouraged by the Francis-
cans rather than the Dominicans, who tended more than the black friars to
distinguish their monkish, monastic, contemplative aspect from their practi-
cal, preaching vocation. In ironic consequence of this nod to the monastery,
their more practically-orientated theological studies (originally alien to the
Franciscan trajectory), somewhat drained of contemplative reference, became
in consequence more exclusively technical. They tended to lose sight of lectio
and to become remorselessly subject to abstrusely logical and relentlessly ra-
tionalistic considerations 22.
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The resulting «terminist» (univocalist, nominalist, and voluntarist) meta-
physic, because of its very desire to stress the contingency and discontinuity
of divine grace with nature, started to set free the natural from the superna-
tural and so to shape for the first time a realm of secular autonomy.
It also compounded the Aristotelian division of physics from metaphysics
which was originally refused by neoplatonism which regarded everything be-
neath the level of the One, even intelligence, as involving transitive kinetic
motion, and not just intransitive action. For this reason thought was conceived
by Plotinus as a more unimpeded motion 23, and there is a sense in which the
whole of Platonic thought is a «physics» – thus Eriugena could include even
God within his divisio naturae. For even the One was regarded, in contrast to
Aristotle’s «unmoved mover», as being as much beyond rest as beyond motion
(since both are mere qualitative states of things and the One is not in any
condition other than its own) and therefore as a kind of hyperbolic motion as
much as a hyperbolic stasis 24. All this meant that Neoplatonism did not, like
Aristotle, conceive of a non-moving and so non-physical dimension of meta-
physical ontological constancy within finitude, even if it recognised some
relative fixity of substance and properties.
Although nominalism questioned the naturalness of this fixity, it com-
pounded and intensified the Aristotelian tendency (arguably somewhat quali-
fied by Aquinas) 25 to isolate motion from ontology, or physics from meta-
physics. A finite world that «transcendentally» and so metaphysically consists
of arbitrary and fluctuating motion, freely determined by God, was one that
could begin to be seen as most fundamentally governed by purely mechanis-
tic dynamics. Such motions reveal the decrees of the divine will, but nothing
of the divine nature, thereby finally sundering the Neoplatonic (and even to a
degree Aristotelian) symbolic link between motion and eternity that Albert
and Aquinas had retained. This sundering was widely regarded as the purging
of a pagan residue.
So one can say that this more radical secularisation was paradoxically the
achievement of a theology trying to ward off a more philosophical mode of
contemplation, and a religiously-slanted pagan philosophy, rather than to in-
tegrate it. As so often in Christian history, a fear of a wider spirituality and of
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the religious other can generate a devil’s alliance of a narrow and exclusive
monotheism with an otherwise pervasive rationalism. Indeed one can argue
that it required the largely Franciscan-nurtured nominalist theology to render
respectable Marsiglio’s secular jurisprudence, and that the increasing indepen-
dence of medicine from theology, as of the body from the soul, was already in
part a derivative of Avicenna’s intendedly Islamic metaphysics with again a cu-
riously secularising upshot.
III
From this brief archaeological foray, it is possible to suggest that theo-
logy has indeed been historically both the originator and the guardian of fea-
tures of the university which we claim to value: its universality, its interdisci-
plinarity and its relative freedom from all forms of state control, under the
protection of the Church – for it is important to remember that even the stu-
dents of Bologna were ultimately operating in the interest of, and so were ul-
timately licensed by, minority political forces.
Of course to be unbound by the state is in this case to be somewhat
bound by another external body, the Church, but perhaps the lesson that is
that it is naïve to think that social freedom is ever anything other than politi-
cal, corporate, specific, and relative. To be socially free is to be free from
someone because ultimately pledged to another, as current British universities
are discovering all too well.
Such a conclusion only escapes the toils of pure relativism in three ways.
First one may claim to escape it if, as purportedly in the case of the Church,
the ultimate political interests of one’s ultimate master or rather mistress are
less temporary, of larger scope, more open to questioning in her own terms,
and less readily defined than those of another. Secondly if, for that mistress,
the issue of ultimate truth is at stake, such that what is being proposed is an
ineluctable free compelling of knowledge by that truth itself. Thirdly, if the
truth and the laws proclaimed by this mistress are in the widest degree specu-
lative and also in the end a matter of faith, then free university inquiry is held
open both in terms of the greatest possible scope and the greatest possible in-
tegration of knowledge.
Hence (to use Luigi Giusanni’s term) the proposal made by theology may
seem to be the most outrageous and the most uncertainly founded, but it is
precisely that proposal which keeps alive the claim to a truly universal un-
JOHN MILBANK
264 SCRIPTA THEOLOGICA / VOL. 50 / 2018
03. Milbank Estudio  14/06/2018  11:38  Página 264
derstanding and truly unified body of knowledge 26. For if human knowledge
can indeed reach as far as God, and if, in history, God has reached down to us,
then clearly, as Newman argued, university teaching cannot ignore these re-
alities and if it does, then it is in effect setting up an anti-university based open
the effective denial of these realities and so foreclosing the possibility of any
really open debate, or any genuinely universal understanding.
Therefore one might say that to found a university is to have faith that
there might one day be something like a universitas of indeed universal scope,
and that one requires the elaboration of theology if we are in any degree to
fulfil that faith. Without this faith it is perhaps inevitable that a university will
sink to being a mere congeries of professional specialisations. For in the ab-
sence of theology the interest in theory and truth for its own sake will tend to
lapse in favour of the pursuit of mere process, and with that lapse universities
will also lose their critical edge.
For a time, starting in the nineteenth century, as Newman noted from
within that period, surrogates for theology proclaimed speculations still less
well-founded, because they sought, in alternatively mechanistic and vitalistic
ways, to reduce the reality of the human soul rather than, like theology, to try
to explain how psychic and material realities can coexist in one cosmos. With
the lapse of these endeavours after more neo-humanistic and then «post-
modern» intervals we now have «neo-modern» piecemeal, but more drastically
materialist anti-psychic reductionisms that try to block any path towards the
university’s own reflexivity or self-justification: namely, how is it that we are
conscious creatures pursuing knowledge of the given world? For reductive
answers can only explain away the very phenomenological terms in which that
question is posed. In thus undercutting the human they finally undercut the
university as originally an arts-curriculum based institution. A mathematicised
and mechanised physics, once nurtured within the heart of the quadrivium, be-
comes the basic paradigm of all university studies, so subverting its original
suspension between the various liberal arts and theology.
Insofar as the arts remain studied today, they are increasingly seen in
terms of a branch of the entertainments industry – as producing a marketable
commodity, rather than as training people in aesthetic and ethical discern-
ment and civilised living. The Leavisite project of ethical formation through
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literature is scarcely revivable in sheerly secular terms, since these now deny
the reality of soul and spirit upon which every humanism depends, while the
dominance of the scientific and research-based model of the university mani-
fests itself in terms of the managerialist organisation of the entertainment-
producing departments. If, as I initially suggested, the organisation of a uni-
versity predetermines what can be studied there, then today, in European
universities, it predetermines what can be studied as always certain techniques
of power and control, of money-making and production of seductive specta-
cle. Where Newman complained that, without the wider wisdom of theology,
political economy is able to proclaim unchallenged the half-truth that wealth
tends to encourage virtue, then today the entire medium of the university is
political-economic and the medium is most certainly the message.
This is the main lesson that most of our students will now learn from us.
And not even pure scientific research can claim to be pursuing the love of
truth for its own sake in any ethically valid manner. For theoria, the philoso-
phical contemplation of truth, is only a valid end of human life if there is a sa-
ving truth to be contemplated – that is to say a truth of the cosmos or the
transcendent that is also good and beautiful and can serve as an orientation for
our practical existences. Otherwise, as St. Augustine taught, the pursuit of
truth is mere curiosity, which is culpable, because the motivation for studying
a grim and meaningless reality can only be prurience, or a desire to exhibit
one’s superiority, or else again a Faustian lust to use this knowledge to mani-
pulate one’s fellow human beings and other living creatures.
The Baconian claim to pursue the useful is only legitimate if we can de-
fine proper ends for usage – which cannot be the single end of utility as such,
else we are lost in the gulfs of tautology whose only real meaning will be the
experimental control of some people by others. Nevertheless, the sense of
wonder generally invoked for even atheist scientists by the study of the physi-
cal world and by new possible contrivances significantly qualifies this demo-
nic temptation and ensures that they already participate, in some degree, in
genuine theoria.
IV
Just how, though, did the research-based model of the University first
arise? It is surely a more or less direct consequence of the enormous influence
of Kantian philosophy, such that the single, thoroughly debatable meta-
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physical position of the «critical philosophy» that might be validly taught
within a university, pre-empts debate by being what the very structure of a
modern university inevitably teaches 27.
That is to say, Kant taught that theoretical reason was unable to reach the
truth of noumena, of things in themselves. He then vigorously proclaimed
the freedom of the lower faculties of the arts, including a now autonomised
philosophy, to teach just what they like, without censorship, concerning the
mere phenomena. But such freedom is but the upshot of irrelevance, because
the three higher and practical faculties of law, medicine and theology (whose
very practicality now, for Kant, permits them to reach the otherwise concealed
noumenal depths) were still bound in tight Prussian fashion by the interests of
the state and of the Lutheran state-church. This model was imitated by both
Schleiermacher and by Humboldt who eventually crafted the shape of the
modern university institution. An infinite horizon of research now opens for
the theoretical sciences, since they can never reach the fully real, nor are they
any longer linked to or guided by our practical, psychic interests.
It is perhaps for this reason that we now see all secular disciplines as «me-
thodologically atheist» even though for the Christian, as Newman argued,
this means that all the truly crucial theoretical questions (which a genuine
practical philosophy cannot ignore) about the mind, the body, nature, history,
language, and even perhaps number, have to go unposed and unanswered.
Meanwhile, for all the greater freedom of the Anglo-Saxon recension of
the Humboldt model, law and medicine have remained rigorously subordina-
te to the interests of the state and have suffered an increasing positivisation and
materialisation in consequence. What is more, a technological paradigm that
was originally, with Paracelsus, medical in origin (as Charles Webster has
shown – even though the Baconian travesty of this undid a new psychic-bodily
integration that was part of Paracelsus’s spiritual pragmatism) 28 has spread to
most of the sciences and then to the social sciences and now to the humanities.
Thus today even the freedom of the theoretical adventure-playground is inva-
ded by the Weberian severity of the bureaucratic obeisance that has been ex-
tracted from the higher faculties ever since the nineteenth century.
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But what of the third higher faculty in modern times? What of the fate
of theology? Ever since Schleiermacher and in despite of his best earlier Ro-
mantic insights, the discipline has been divided and so slowly destroyed by a
division between objectified research-based interests in history and philology
on the one hand, and sheerly professional interests in priestly or ministerial
formation on the other. Just as it is not allowed that there might be a theolo-
gical approach to history, or language or music or philosophy or even mathe-
matics in general that could be determinative of those disciplines, so this per-
spective has been internalised, and now for the most part there cannot be a
theological approach to the Bible or to Church history and so forth. Actual
theology in the traditional sense of participation in the mind of God under the
light of faith as well as reason is allowed few academic positions, while it is
itself often crudely divided between a philosophy of religion supposedly ap-
proaching God in the basis of an objective reason and a dogmatic theology
that is either meant to listen to the Biblical critics as if they were announcing
foundational facts – or else to base itself upon probable evidences of revelation
or else again, sheerly given words, fideistically assented to.
V
What drops out here is the idea of faith as a complex fusion of evidence,
reasoning, imaginative, and affective experience, and those several fine modern
theologians who have restored this sort of multi-referential integrity have
either been outside the university context or have had to struggle against it.
In this way, given the gradual decline in power of the churches, the theo-
logical death-knell in academia was sounded long ago. Research into the Bi-
ble and Church history can well be done elsewhere, as can, and more properly
it will be argued, clerical formation. Nor will «religious studies» save theo-
logy, since this is not a real discipline but an alliance of disciplines under the
focus on an area of study, which in academic terms is something of an ano-
maly. Not a unique one indeed, since one can have «maritime studies» and so
forth, but all such subject areas are prey to capture in the future by more dis-
ciplinary defined departments – and this is already occurring. Thus history
and the social sciences can readily claim to cover all the concerns placed under
the religious studies heading.
It follows that the only defence theology is left with is attack and ultimate
questioning. There is no point in trying to protect the place of theology in
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the university as today most widely understood: the point is rather, as with
Newman, to question these premises. It is counterwise to defend the ground-
ing of the university not mainly or exclusively in research, but primarily in the
arts (taken to include mathematics and a more philosophical rather than
exclusively experimental approach to nature) and in a wide curriculum.
Above all we need to question the currently assumed separation of theo-
logy from philosophy which did not hold for the Fathers nor the Middle Age,
even if its later period started to instigate it, as we have seen 29. The upshot of
this separation is that theologians, at least in their initial programme of study,
tend to deal only with the philosophy of religion and not with philosophy as
such, which is to say, with philosophy’s most ultimate scope, which is meta-
physics. But this restriction inevitably dooms theology to cultural and acade-
mic marginality, for it means that it is assumed to have nothing fundamental to
say about how things are or about what it means to be able to say anything
whatsoever. Instead, theology is seen as a regional discourse within the field of
being, as both a set of debatable arguments as to the ultimate causes of finite
being and a debatable claim to an event of revelation within the same field.
Both the centrality of the arts and the inseparability of theology and phi-
losophy can be seen as expressions of a genuine Christian humanism, and so
of the doctrine of the God made flesh. For it was the non-Marcionism of
Christian orthodoxy (the acceptance that the Christian God was still the God
of the Hebrew Scriptures even if this was now the «Old Testament») that
made Christianity respect the law even though it cannot quite save us, and by
analogy to respect pagan learning even though it does not reach to the beati-
fic vision.
The same attitude must today lead Christians to respect the many mem-
bers of other religions who now inhabit this continent and to welcome them
to study alongside us in theological departments. This welcoming could give
us the opportunity to shape a new sort of global Literae Humaniores that now
may provide the very best sort of arts grounding to produce a well-read, civi-
lised and reflective student.
Indeed it may well be that from Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism
we might question one accidental form that our non-Marcionism has taken:
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namely a tendency to sever theology from the more «elementary» arts and so
to reserve the Bible for higher and clerical study. We need now rather to intro-
duce the study of the Bible also at the lower arts foundational level, as the
French are now considering doing in schools. This would then recover some-
thing of the pre trivium/quadrivium tradition of Augustine and Bede, but with
a new extension to the laity, though not, it is to be hoped, with a Protestant
disembedding from liturgy and tradition.
In this way we could start to overcome an unfortunate unlinking of our
Hellenic from our Hebraic legacy which has sometimes led to the misunder-
standing of both and to result, as we have seen in the case of nominalism-
voluntarism, in a bizarre, supposedly «Hebraic» invention of a «Hellenic»
secular autonomy, as if even Aristotle did not in fact worship the gods.
Theology should therefore shelter the development of the «theologies»
of other religions, besides encouraging the study of the history of religions,
first and foremost because this context cannot be avoided by the modern theo-
logian.
Nevertheless, the prime meaning of theology as «Christian theology»
should not be surrendered, because this is the extended name of the discipli-
ne that carries in the most universal and integrated way the central legacy of
the West, which has to a unique degree envisioned the ultimate as transcen-
dent life and Goodness, and sought to orientate also political life in terms of
the soul’s attunement by that good.
For the original character of Greek philosophy as a care of the self as well
as a care of the truth has only been perpetuated in the west by Jewish, Islamic,
and Christian philosophical or theological thinking. All three of these tradi-
tions have nobly sustained the dual legacy of Athens and Jerusalem. Yet it is the
Christian legacy which initially and uniquely re-read the pagan humanities and
encouraged a certain desacralisation of law and ordinary life. Not in such a way
as altogether to detach them from orientation by grace, but both to avoid ido-
lisation of the merely human and also to allow a free exploration of the natural
that can itself give constantly new insights into the meaning of the supernatu-
ral. It is this «distinguishing to unite» (to use the phrase of Jacques Maritain) 30
that perhaps allows Christianity more readily to assess both what is valid and
what is invalid in the enlightenment legacy that is its bastard offspring.
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The argument for theology in the University should therefore be also an
argument for the legitimate consideration of theological perspectives through-
out the secular university if it is to be genuinely plural, open, independent,
and free. It is also an argument for the existence of specifically Christian uni-
versities: my own view is that we need a healthy diversity of both secular and
faith-based higher educational academies if we are to keep genuine debate
alive. But most of all it is an argument for recovering the true idea of a univer-
sity if we are not further to acquiesce in our current occidental degeneration,
our loss of any sense of where we come from, who we really are and where we
strive to reach 31.
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